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I. INTRODUCTION
On November 7, 2000, the Venezuelan National Assembly
adopted the "Enabling Law," which grants President Hugo
Chavez the power to enact laws addressing a broad range of
issues without legislative debate or approval.' President Chavez
is now empowered to decree laws in areas ranging from banking
1. Jose de Cordoba, For Venezuela's President, a Long Leash, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8,
2000, at A22.
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to petroleum to land reform.' This article will examine the
constitutionality of the "Enabling Law" along with its effects on
the Venezuelan political system and foreign economic interests.
Upon analyzing the relevant provisions of the recently adopted
Venezuelan Constitution, it appears that President Chavez has
overstepped the Constitutional boundary separating the
executive and legislative branches. The negative effects of this
extra-constitutional grab of power on the Venezuelan political
system and foreign economic interests are cause for concern both
within and beyond Venezuela.
The "Enabling Law" essentially eliminates the capacity of
the elected opposition to exercise any power and grants President
Chavez a very effective tool to chip away at the economic base of
the Venezuelan upper class, which has been his traditional
political opponent. Additionally, the "Enabling Law" further
empowers President Chavez to pursue economic and social
policies that may be inimical to foreign investment. In short,
President Chavez, taking advantage of his immense popularity
and the paralysis of the traditional political parties, has granted
himself powers which are inconsistent with Venezuela's
Constitution and potentially devastating to Venezuela's future
political and economic development.
II. HISTORY
For most of the second half of the twentieth century,
Venezuela was considered, by Latin American standards, to be a
model democratic society. With the fall of the Perez Jimenez
dictatorship in January of 1958, Venezuela embarked on an
uninterrupted sequence of peaceful and democratic transitions of
power.3 While other Latin American countries suffered through
armed leftist insurgencies, constant threats of military coups,
extreme polarization between political parties and huge
inequalities in wealth, Venezuela became the exception to the
rule.4 It possessed a professional military, which remained
confined to their barracks, a political life dominated by two
2. BBC News, Chavez given sweeping powers (Nov. 7, 2000), available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/englishworld/americas/newsidlO11000/1011963.stm





centrist political parties that shared power peacefully, and a
progressive society with a growing middle class.5 This stable
socio-political system was essentially founded upon three key
elements: a professional military subservient to civilian
authority, an understanding between the major political parties
to collaborate and respect elections, and a high growth oil export
economy.
How then did we arrive at the Venezuela of 2001, where an
ex-"golpista" military officer, possessing no traditional party
affiliation and espousing an extreme nationalist/militarist
ideology, was elected President practically unopposed, has
abolished the Constitution, adopted his own Constitution, and
effectively deprived the National Assembly of its legislative
powers? All of this unfolding while the gap between the wealthy
and the poor widens and capital flies out of the country for the
safety of foreign banks. The answer to this question can be
formulated with reference to three February dates in recent
Venezuelan history, February 18, 1983, February 27, 1989, and
February 4, 1992.6 These dates served as harbingers for the
decline of the Venezuelan economy, the collapse of the traditional
party based political system, and the re-entry of the military into
the political life of the country.7 These changed circumstances
are what ultimately allowed Mr. Chavez to win the presidency in
1998, and bring about the new Constitution of 1999.
On February 18, 1983, a date known as "Black Friday"
among Venezuelans, the "bolivar" was severely devalued as a
result of the high level of foreign debt and the declining price of
oil.' Most Venezuelan's living standards were affected
detrimentally and the flow of "petro-dollars" that had financed
generous social policies and helped to maintain the political
patronage machines of the two major political parties began to
recede. The days of "Venezuela Saudita," as the oil rich nation
had come to be known, were over.' Many middle class
Venezuelans would slip back into the ranks of the lower class as
5. Id.
6. Daniel H. Levine & Brian F. Crisp, Legitimacy, Governability, and Reform in
Venezuela, supra note 3, at 225.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. James Ferguson, IN FOCUS: VENEZUELA 6 (Duncan Green ed., 1994).
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the value of their income and savings practically evaporated."
In spite of economic hard times, the two traditional political
parties, the Comit6 de Organizaci6n Politica Electoral
Independiente [hereinafter, "COPEI"], a slightly right of center
Christian Democrat party, and the left of center Acci6n
Democratica [hereinafter, AD], were able to maintain control of
the political system throughout the 80's. In 1984, COPEI
President Herrera Campins handed power over to AD President
Jaime Lusinchi who in turn was succeeded by his AD rival, and
former president, Carlos Andres Perez in 1989.1 This peaceful
rotation of power was consistent with the understanding
established between all the major political parties right after the
fall of the Perez Jimenez dictatorship and embodied in the 1958
Pact of Punto Fijo.1' The Pact of Punto Fijo obligated all of the
political parties to commit themselves to democratic government
and procedures when in power and to serve as a "loyal
opposition" when out of power."3 As the decade came to a close,
however, the order established by the Punto Fijo understanding
began to show weaknesses. While COPEI and AD still
demonstrated a willingness to respect elections and share power,
the people's confidence in both parties began to wane because of
the worsening economy and the ever-increasing revelations of
public corruption. 4 Popular expectations rose in early 1989,
when Perez, promising a return to the prosperity of his previous
term (1974-1979), was swept into power. 5 However, the public
mood quickly changed when Perez revealed that he had become
an adherent of neo-liberal economic reforms which would
demand short-term sacrifices. 6
On February 27, 1989, popular frustration with the
10. Winfield J. Burggraaff & Richard L. Millett, More than Failed Coups: The Crisis
in Venezuelan Civil-Military Relations, in LESSONS OF THE VENEZUELAN
EXPERIENCE, supra note 3, at 59.
11. John D. Martz, Political Parties and the Democratic Crisis, in LESSONS OF
THE VENEZUELAN EXPERIENCE, supra note 3, at 33.
12. Id. at 32.
13. Winfield J. Burggraaff & Richard L. Millett, More than Failed Coups: The Crisis
in Venezuelan Civil-Military Relations, in LESSONS OF THE VENEZUELAN
EXPERIENCE, supra note 3, at 56.
14. Andrew Templeton, The Evolution of Popular Opinion, in LESSONS OF THE
VENEZUELAN EXPERIENCE, supra note 3, at 79.
15. John D. Martz, Political Parties and the Democratic Crisis, in LESSONS OF




traditional political order finally ignited as a three day riot,
resulting in extensive looting and over 1000 deaths, broke out in
response to a bus fare increase provoked by a Perez imposed hike
in the price of gas.'7 Ultimately, military force was necessary to
quash what came to be known as the "caracazo.""8 The "caracazo"
not only demonstrated the discontent of a great many
Venezuelans with the traditional political order, but it also
focused the grievances and thoughts of many junior military
officers. 9 After the "caracazo," several junior military officers,
prevented from further professional advancement because of
their lack of political connections, began to complain that they
were serving as the repressive arm of a corrupt civilian
government. ° Reflecting on the "caracazo," then Lieutenant
Colonel Hugo Chavez stated that the "military was being
transformed 'into a praetorian guard to protect a government
that serves the interests of a small group of individuals.' 21 The
Venezuelan government's decision to use military force to quell
the "caracazo" and subsequent civil disturbances would later
prove to be a motivating factor in bringing the Venezuelan
military back into the political arena.
The Constitution of 1961, adopted in the wake of nearly
continuous rule by military dictatorships, was designed to ensure
military subservience to civilian authority. The document itself
unequivocally stated:
[T~he National Armed Forces form a non-political,
obedient and non-deliberative institution,
organized by the State to secure national defense,
the stability of democratic institutions and respect
for the Constitution and Laws, the observance of
which shall always be above any other obligation.
The National Armed Forces shall be in the service
of the Republic and in no case of that of any person
or political partisanship."
17. Ferguson, supra note 7, at 5.
18. Winfield J. Burggraaff & Richard L. Millett, More than Failed Coups: The Crisis
in Venezuelan Civil-Military Relations, in LESSONS OF THE VENEZUELAN
EXPERIENCE, supra note 3, at 59.
19. Id. at 61.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 68.
22. Felipe Aguero, Debilitating Democracy: Political Entities and Military Rebels, in
LESSONS OF THE VENEZUELAN EXPERIENCE, supra note 3, at 144.
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This clear Constitutional mandate along with provisions
providing for mandatory retirement after thirty years of service,
the dissolution of an integrated command structure, and
legislative oversight of promotions above the rank of lieutenant
colonel, provided for peaceful and productive civil-military
relations." Military energies were also successfully transferred
from political activities to other efforts such as the combating of
the leftist insurgency of the 60's and participation in the
developmental efforts of the 70's and 80's.24
However, the provisions of the Constitution of 1961 were
insufficient to maintain peace between government and military
in the circumstances of the early 90's. The same small cadre of
junior military officers, that had earlier complained of the
politicized system of promotions and of their new found duties of
repressing popular protests, organized themselves as the
Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario - 200 (MBR - 200).25
With no clear political ideology, the group's identifying principals
were a nostalgic and romantic adherence to the legacy of Simon
Bolivar and intransigent opposition to the status quo.26 While
the military high command continued to collaborate with the
traditional political parties, these junior officers plotted to rid
themselves of the political and military order they so despised.
As the number of Venezuelans living in poverty reached eight
percent, revelations of public corruption increased, and President
Perez's approval rating sank below twenty percent, the
Bolivarianos had reason to believe that the public would support
a coup d'etat.27
On February 4, 1992, the Bolivarianos decided to strike. As
President Perez returned from an official trip to Switzerland,
about ten percent of all Army units mutinied and attempted to
take over government, military, and communication facilities.
President Perez, barely escaping assassination, was able to get to
a safe television station, and made an appeal to the armed forces
23. Id. at 145-46.
24. Id. at 146-47.
25. Winfield J. Burggraaff & Richard L. Millett, More than Failed Coups: The Crisis
in Venezuelan Civil-Military Relations, in LESSONS OF THE VENEZUELAN
EXPERIENCE, supra note 3, at 65-68.
26. Id. at 66.
27. Id. at 69.
28. Id. at 65.
270 [Vol. 32:2
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to remain loyal and defend the Constitution. 9 Within a few
hours, the rebellion had been quelled and the coup plotters
arrested, but the Venezuelan tradition of military restraint in
political matters had been shattered. A later military uprising
on November 27 of the same year would also be quashed, but the
new reality remained unchanged. The Venezuelan military had
reentered the political arena." As was indicated by the words of
one of the Bolivariano coup plotters, political change was almost
certain: "What happened on February 4th was only a sneeze
heralding a coming cold."31
What was surprising was the type of cold that infected the
Venezuelan body politic. The Venezuelan electorate's strong
commitment to democracy, as was evidenced by the almost
universal lack of popular support for the attempted coups, forced
the Bolivarianos to pursue power within the confines of the
electoral system." Venezuelan's respect for constitutional order
and procedures was further highlighted at this time by the fact
that Carlos Andres Perez, instead of falling prey to a military
coup, was peacefully removed from office on corruption charges in
1992."3 The Venezuelan Congress installed Ramon Velasquez, a
candidate acceptable to both AD and COPEI, as interim
president." However, due to the fact that most of their leaders,
including Chavez, were in jail following the coups, the
Bolivarianos were unable to effectively participate in the 1993
national elections. In a demonstration of popular disgust with
the traditional political parties but a reluctance to depart from
the political center, the Venezuelan people returned former
President Rafael Caldera, who had broken away from COPEI, to
power.35
The Caldera presidency was characterized by low economic
growth, high inflation, severe reductions in government
29. Ferguson, supra note 9, at 30.
30. Winfield J. Burggraaff & Richard L. Millett, More than Failed Coups: The Crisis
in Venezuelan Civil-Military Relations, in LESSONS OF THE VENEZUELAN
EXPERIENCE, supra note 3, at 71.
31. Id. at 65.
32. Andy Webb-Vidal, After two years Chavez remains an enigma, FIN. TIMES, Jul.
29, 2000, available at
http://news.ft.com ftgx.gi/ftc?pagenameView&c=Article&cid=FT3PLP9R8BC&live=true.
33. LESSONS OF THE VENEZUELAN EXPERIENCE, supra note 3, at 400.
34. Id.
35. No party for the parties, ECONOMIST, Nov. 8, 1997, at 38.
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spending, and a grudging reluctance to adopt even the most basic
free market reforms.36  Soon after entering office, President
Caldera pardoned and released the coup plotters from jail. 7 The
MBR-200 would subsequently unite behind the charismatic
Chavez as their leader.3 As AD and COPEI fortunes continued
to decline because of their inability to present a persuasive vision
of the future, effectively oppose Caldera, or shake off the tinge of
corruption, the way was open for a true outsider to assume the
presidency in the elections of 1998.
As the 1998 election campaign began, the early front-runner
was Irene Saez, a former Miss Universe and former mayor of a
wealthy Caracas suburb. As Saez's lead in the polls shrank, she
made the colossal error of forsaking her independent status and
accepting the nomination of COPEIL Saez would ultimately see
her lead in the polls drop from over fifty percent to the low single
digits alongside the official AD candidate, Luis Alfaro Ucero.0
Chavez, on the other hand, would see his lead soar from the
single digits to almost fifty percent as his message of overturning
the entire political and economic order proved to have more
appeal to the impoverished masses who were eager for dramatic
change.4 Fearing a Chavez victory, both the COPEI and AD
candidates dropped out of the race and threw their support
behind Henrique Salas Romer, an independent candidate who
was closest to Chavez in the polls. 2 This last ditch effort proved
futile, however, as Chavez triumphed on election day with fifty-
six percent of the vote.43
AD and COPEI's nearly forty year monopoly on political
power was put to an end by an ambitious military officer who
skillfully manipulated popular discontent with public corruption
and a faltering economy. The traditional political parties'
inability to reform themselves, adjust to the changed economic
circumstances, or effectively unite against a threatening outsider
sealed their demise. More was at stake, however, in the elections
of 1998, than who would occupy the Miraflores presidential
36. It's all Chavez, ECONOMIST, Jul. 4, 1998, at 30.
37. LESSONS OF THE VENEZUELAN EXPERIENCE, supra note 3, at 401.
38. Id.
39. Closing the gap, ECONOMIST, Oct. 10, 1998, at 35.
40. Id.
41. Venezuela's humbled parties, ECONOMIST, Dec. 5, 1998, at 38.
42. Id.
43. A message from the people, ECONOMIST, Dec. 12, 1998, at 35.
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palace. Throughout the campaign, Chavez had consistently
promised to convoke a Constitutional Assembly, which would
create a new Constitution, once he was elected." President
Chavez was now determined to follow through on that promise,
and Venezuela would soon embark upon a complete restructuring
of its political, economic, social and legal system.
III. THE PROCESS OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM
Upon assuming office in February of 1999, President Chavez
made clear that the centerpiece of his first year in office would be
the creation of a new Constitution. 5 A new Constitutional
Assembly would allow Chavez to create a whole new political and
social framework to his liking and permit him to circumvent a
Congress and Judiciary still dominated by the traditional
political parties. In a demonstration of Chavez's strong popular
appeal despite worsening economic times, the Venezuelan people,
in April of 1999, voted by a margin of ninety-two percent to eight
percent to convoke a Constitutional Assembly.46 In elections for
the Assembly in July of 1999, Chavez's followers won 123 of the
131 seats.47  Among the newly- elected Constitutional drafters
were Chavez's wife, brother, Chief of Staff, and twenty of his
former military colleagues.4" COPEI and AD, recognizing their
demise, failed to participate in the elections."
Throughout the campaign for the Constitutional Assembly,
Chavez had called on the Assembly, once elected, to dissolve
Congress and the Supreme Court.8 Not surprisingly, one of the
first acts of the Assembly, meeting in the Venezuelan Capitol,
was to bar the Venezuelan Congress from meeting and passing
new laws.' This occurred despite the fact that the April, 1999,
44. Id.
45. U.S. Dep't of State, 1999 Country Report on Economic Policy and Trade
Practices - Venezuela (2000), available at
http://www.state.govlwww/issues/economic/trade-reports/1999/veneuelahtml.
46. Political Database of the Americas, Venezuela Referendum Results (Apr. 26,
1999), available at http;/Ywww.Georgetown.edu/pdba/Elecdata/Venezuela/ref99.html.
47. CNN, Venezuelan president gets big win assembly vote (Jul. 26, 1999), available
at http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/americas/9907/26/venezuela.
48. Id.
49. CNN, Venezuela's president says national assembly will have broad powers (July
25, 1999), available at http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/americas/9907/25/venezuela.election.
50. Id.
51. CNN, Venezuelan president's fans, foes fight in streets of Caracas (Aug. 27, 1999),
20011
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referendum question did not provide for the endowing of
legislative powers to the Constitutional Assembly.52  The
Assembly also reviewed complaints about the judiciary and
removed eight lower court judges from the bench.53 When
opposition legislators scaled the fence surrounding the Capitol
and attempted to meet in their chambers, they were thrown out
by the use of armed force. 4 The Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, which had earlier ruled that the Constitutional Assembly
would not have the authority to dissolve either Congress or the
Supreme Court, resigned stating that "the court would commit
suicide rather than wait to be killed by the Assembly."55 By the
end of the summer of 1999, Chavez had effectively vanquished
the Congress and the Supreme Court and was well on his way to
completing a new Constitution embodying his "Bolivarian"
principles.
While Chavez pursued the adoption of a new Constitution,
he also attempted to consolidate his power within the current
Constitutional framework. On April 26, 1999, one day after
Chavez obtained the ninety-two percent vote in favor of calling a
Constitutional Assembly, he asked Congress to adopt an
"enabling law," which would permit him to promulgate economic
reforms without the consent of Congress." The Congress, shell-
shocked by the election results and an economy suffering an
unemployment rate of 11%, a budget deficit that reached 9.5% of
GDP and a price of oil that had fallen to $8.43US, granted his
request.
57
The Constitution of 1961 allowed for the adoption of such
"enabling laws" with regards to economic and financial matters.5
In fact, the Venezuelan Congress had granted decree powers via
an "enabling law" five times since 1961.59 Consistent with the
five previous exercises of this power, the April, 1999, "enabling
available at http://www.cnn.comiWORLD/americas/9908/27/venezuela.riot.
52. Political Database of the Americas, supra note 46.
53. Steve Ellner, Hugo Chavez takes on the Venezuelan Establishment (Oct. 7, 1999),
available at http://www.neravt.com/eft/ellnerl.html.
54. CNN, supra note 51.
55. Id.
56. CNN, Venezuela's Chavez assumes new powers, readies new taxes (Apr. 26, 1999),
available at httpJ/www.cnn.comiWORLD/americas/9904I26/venezuela.
57. U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 45.
58. VENEZUELAN CONST. art. 190:8.
59. Brian F. Crisp, Presidential Decree Authority in Venezuela, in EXECUTIVE
DECREE AUTHORITY 146 (John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart eds., 1998).
[Vol. 32:2
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law" was limited both in scope and duration.6 0  Chavez
proclaiming that the "enabling law is the first step toward
reducing the deficit, toward leashing the devil" went on to impose
a .5% tax on financial transactions and a 15.5% value added tax
while decreeing a 20% pay raise for public sector workers.'
Chavez also promulgated legislation in different economic
sectors, such as energy, mining, government procurement,
income taxes, and agricultural credit. President Chavez's
attempts to consolidate his power within and without the current
Constitutional framework would ultimately merge once the draft
of the new Constitution was complete.
On November 19, 1999, the Constitutional Assembly
completed its work and submitted the new proposed Constitution
to the National Electoral Council, which scheduled a referendum
on its adoption for December 15, 1999.6" On its face, the new
proposed Constitution was distinguished by its repeated
invocation of "Bolivarian" precepts. Indeed, the document
officially changed the country's name to the Bolivarian Republic
of Venezuela.64  Consistent with the ambiguous nature of
"Bolivarism," the new Constitution did not embody a clear set of
ideological principles. One international observer described it as
establishing a political and economic model that was "part Arab
oil kingdom, part European cradle-to-grave welfare state, with a
dash of Latin American authoritarianism thrown in."
65
In the economic and social realm, the new proposed
Constitution called for increased state intervention in the
economy, prohibited the privatization of the state-run national oil
company, rescinded recent "management friendly" labor law
reforms, mandated a minimum wage reflecting the costs of a
"basic basket of goods and services," and made guarantees of
universal health care, education, pensions, and employment.66
Civilian oversight of the military was sharply curtailed with
promotions now being vested within the military instead of
60. Id. at 154.
61. Venezuela's Chavez assumes new powers, readies new taxes, supra note 56.
62. U.S. Dep't of State, supra note 45.
63. Id.
64. CNN, Venezuelan assembly begins final talks on new constitution (Nov. 12,
1999), available at http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/americas/9911/12/venezuela.constitution.
65. Christina Hoag, Commentary: This Constitution Could Wreck Venezuela (Dec.




Congress and with the appointment of a military comptroller
instead of the national comptroller to oversee its finances. 7 In
the political realm, the new Constitution would empower the
President to call referendums on national issues at will, name an
Executive Vice President, which would essentially have the role
of a prime minister, and to dissolve the National Assembly under
certain circumstances." The presidential term was extended
from five to six years and immediate re-election was permitted.6 9
The old bicameral National Congress would be replaced with a
unicameral National Assembly that could empower the President
to promulgate laws in any policy area, not just economic and
financial matters, through the passage of an "enabling law."7
Despite the protests of opposition leaders and prominent
economists, the Venezuelan people, by a margin of seventy-one
percent to twenty-nine percent, approved the newly proposed
Constitution.7
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE "ENABLING LAW"
After new elections for President and for the National
Assembly, which Chavez and his followers handily won, the
National Assembly adopted another, more far reaching "enabling
law." This "enabling law" authorized the President to
promulgate legislation in the areas of finance, the economy and
society, infrastructure, personal and legal security, science and
technology, and the civil service." President Chavez explained
his view on the difference between the two enabling laws enacted
during his tenure thus far: "This is an enabling law for the
revolution. The other was for the transition."73
The fact that adoption of an "enabling law" is provided for in
the Constitution and that said Constitution was adopted through
a democratic process, which expressed the consent of the people
67. CubaNet News, Critics Compare Chavez to Castro (Nov. 26, 1999), available at
http://64.21.33.164/Cnews/y99/26e8.html.
68. CONST. OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA (1999), 5:2 art.
236.
69. Venezuelan assembly begins final talks on new constitution, supra note 64.
70. CONST. OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA (1999), 5:2 art.
203.
71. Political Database of the Americas, supra note 46.
72. Gaceta Legal No. 1005 (Nov. 15, 2000), 1226-1230.




is beyond reproach. 4 What has yet to be addressed, however, is
whether the "enabling law" provision of the Constitution, Article
236(a), and the manner in which President Chavez has exercised
it is consistent with the rest of the Constitution. If the "enabling
law" provision or its use were inconsistent with the Constitution,
it would be the duty of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice,
Venezuela's highest court, to resolve this dilemma. Upon review
of the relevant provisions of the 1999 Constitution, a central
conclusion of this article is that the November, 2000, "enabling
law" violates the doctrine of separation of powers embodied in the
1999 Constitution. Such a sweeping grant of legislative power
for over a year is inconsistent with the Constitution's mandate of
legislative powers to the National Assembly and its command
that the separate branches of government should collaborate and
avoid the usurpation of power. The unlikelihood that a Chavez
influenced Supreme Tribunal of Justice will nullify this "enabling
law," only reinforces the impression that a domineering and
popular President, whose commitment to democratic principles is
questionable, has rendered the doctrine of separation of powers
irrelevant in Venezuela.
At this point, it is prudent to engage in an analysis of how
the separation of powers doctrine has been applied to the
executive/legislative relationship in Latin America, in general,
and Venezuela, in particular. Such an analysis will hopefully
prevent Anglo-American concepts of civil government from
imposing themselves too harshly in the context of a Latin
American political environment. One should not condemn a
certain system of democratic government just because it deviates
from the familiar models of the United States and Western
Europe.
Only three Latin American constitutions, those of Argentina,
Brazil, and Colombia, permit the president to establish new
legislation without first having been granted explicit authority to
do so." The "enabling law" provisions of both the 1961 and 1999
74. Approval of how the 1999 Constitution was created and ratified should not be
confused for approval of all actions taken by the Constitutional Assembly. It is the
author's opinion that the Constitutional Assembly exceeded the boundaries of its
authority when it dissolved Congress and forced the Supreme Court to disband.
75. Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart, Presidentialsim and Democracy
in Latin America: Rethinking the Terms of the Debate in PRESIDENTIALISM AND
DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA 45 (Scott Mainwaring and Matthew Soberg Shugart
eds. 1997). Colombia's president was included because of his extensive decree authority
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Venezuelan Constitutions fall into the category of what has been
called "delegated legislative authority" or legislative authority,
which has been explicitly delegated to the president by an act of
the legislature.7" This sort of decree authority is fairly common
in Latin America with the Constitutions of five nations, including
Venezuela, permitting the legislature to delegate lawmaking
authority to the executive.77
A review of the five instances, between 1961 and 1999, when
the Venezuelan Congress enacted an "enabling law" indicate that
these grants of authority, at least in the Venezuelan context,
have always been characterized by limits on scope and time. An
"enabling law" was adopted in the administrations of Romulo
Betancourt, Carlos Andres Perez (1974-79), Jaime Lusinchi,
Ramon Velasquez, and Rafael Caldera (1993-98).78 The
Bentancourt, Perez, and Lusinchi "enabling laws" each lasted one
year while the grant of power to Velasquez lasted only four
months and Caldera's only thirty days. 9
More importantly, for the purposes of this article, each of
these five "enabling laws" was characterized by specific
limitations on the scope of the authority granted. The Perez
"enabling law," which is considered to be the one which granted
the broadest authority, allowed President Perez to reform the
national finance system, nationalize the iron ore industry, pay off
the debt of the Venezuelan Social Security Institute, uphold the
pension and seniority rights of workers, and to establish a new
minimum wage.80 In a reaction to what was perceived as Perez's
excessive use of his "enabling law" authority, the "enabling laws"
of the Lusinchi, Velasquez, and Caldera administrations were
characterized by more carefully defined scopes of authority.81
Lusinchi was authorized to decrease government spending by
cutting government salaries by ten percent, to increase revenues
by increasing the tax on alcohol by a range of five percent to
thirty percent, and to reorganize the public sector more
under his emergency powers.
76. Crisp, supra note 59, at 146.
77. John M. Carey, Et. AL, Appendix: Outlines of Constitutional Powers in Latin
America, supra note 75, at 440-60. The five countries are Chile, Colombia, Peru,
Uruguay, and Venezuela.
78. Crisp, supra note 59, at 146-51.
79. Id.
80. Crisp, supra note 59, at 147.
81. Crisp, supra note 59, at 148-49.
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efficiently. 2 President Velasquez was given powers to reform the
tax system, provide credit for low cost housing, stimulate growth
in the agricultural sector, and to sell a government owned
airline." By 1994, the Caldera "enabling law" only authorized
the President to engage in the unpopular tasks of imposing a
luxury tax, a wholesale sales tax, and a tax on savings accounts,
and to abolish the value added tax. 4 President Caldera issued
only four decrees pursuant to this "enabling law."85
As will be demonstrated later, the "enabling law" of
November, 2000, grants President Chavez decree authority far
beyond the scope of any previous "enabling law." While Latin
democracies differ from their Anglo-American and Western
European counterparts in the dynamics of the
executive/legislative relationship, the ceding of legislative
authority embodied in the November, 2000, "enabling law" is
without precedent in recent Venezuelan and Latin American
history.
Articles 136 through 139 of the 1999 Constitution provide for
a clear separation of powers between the three branches of
government and mandate that each branch collaborate in power
and refrain from usurping power from another branch. Article
136 provides "[elach one of the branches . . . has its own
functions, but the organs on which the exercise of the functions is
incumbent will collaborate among themselves in the realization
of the goals of the State."6 Articles 138 and 139 attempt to
prevent any usurpation of power by stating, "[aill usurped
authority is ineffective and its acts are null .... The exercise of
the Public Power carries individual responsibility for abuse or
deviation of power for violation of this Constitution or the law."87
These provisions presumably establish that the sphere of each
branch's authority and power is established by the Constitution,
that any usurpation of power by one branch is prohibited and will
be considered null, and that individuals serving in an official
capacity are responsible for maintaining the separation of
82. Crisp, supra note 59, at 148.
83. Crisp, supra note 59, at 149.
84. Crisp, supra note 59, at 151.
85. Id.
86. CONST. OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA (1999), 4:1 art.
136.




powers. Furthermore, these articles aim to protect the integrity
of each branch and thereby ensure a system in which each
coordinate branch "checks and balances" the others.
Articles 186 to 224 define the structure, composition, and
powers of the National Assembly. Article 187 enumerates the
powers of the National Assembly and, in clause 1, unequivocally
grants that body the power "to legislate on the matters of
national competence and on the functioning of the different
branches of the National Power.""8 Other clauses of the same
Article grant the National Assembly the power to "function
control over the Government," to "approve the national budget,"
and to "approve the general guidelines of the plan of economic
and social development of the Nation." 9 The 1999 Constitution,
following the traditional three-branch model, grants legislative
power to a popularly elected, multi-membered, and deliberative
body.
Within these articles, the one exception to the overall grant
of legislative powers to the National Assembly is Article 203.
This article asserts that "laws sanctioned by the National
Assembly by three-fifths of its members, in order to establish the
directives, purposes, and the framework of the matters that are
delegated to the President of the Republic are enabling laws with
rank and value of law. The framework laws must specify the
period of their exercise."90 Article 203 essentially allows the
National Assembly to delegate lawmaking authority to the
President in certain areas but requires that this grant of
authority be limited both in substance and time. Considering the
clear Constitutional mandate that the National Assembly is the
legislative power of the Nation, Article 203 should be interpreted
narrowly so as to protect that branch's sphere of power. The
National Assembly may grant the President lawmaking powers
in a very limited fashion, but it cannot broadly abandon its duty
to legislate. A loose interpretation of Article 203 that would
allow the National Assembly to summarily hand over a broad
range of its authority to the President makes a mockery of the
88. CONST. OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA (1999), 5:1 art.
187(1).
89. CONST. OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA (1999), 5:1 art.
187(3), (6), (8).
90. CONST. OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA (1999), 5:1 art.
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very institution which was created and elected to legislate. Such
a ceding of legislative powers is contrary to the doctrine of
separation of powers and system of checks and balances
enshrined in the 1999 Constitution.
An "enabling law" specifically limited in scope and duration
would probably be consistent with both the rest of the
Constitution and recent Venezuelan history. For example, an
"enabling law" granting the President authority to make laws
regulating oil exploration for a period of ninety days would most
likely pass Constitutional muster, but a grant of authority to
enact "whichever law the President deems appropriate" for a
period of one year would not be Constitutional. The "enabling
law" adopted in November of 2000, has more in common with the
latter example than the former. The National Assembly handed
over complete lawmaking authority to the President in six very
broad categories for a period of a year. These six broad
categories can be stretched to cover practically any aspect of
Venezuelan life. Complete power over the finance, economic, and
social sectors can be used to control every particular detail of the
nation's economic life. Regulatory powers in the areas of
infrastructure and the civil service will permit Chavez to single-
handedly restructure government agencies, programs, and
projects. The ability to rule by decree in the fields of personal
and legal security and science and technology, give the President
potentially repressive powers in matters of civil society,
communication, and technological advancement. It is difficult to
contend that the 1999 Constitution, which commits Venezuela to
a democratic type of government in which power is separated
among branches and in which the legislative authority is granted
to the National Assembly, would permit the National Assembly
to abdicate to the President its duty to make the nation's laws
over a broad range of topics for a year.
Articles 225 to 237, which establish the President's sphere of
power reinforce the argument that the Constitution does not
permit the ceding of nearly complete lawmaking authority to the
President. Article 236, which enumerates the President's
powers, assigns to him the powers of Commander and Chief of
the military, the power to conduct the nation's foreign relations,
appoint Ministers, negotiate loans, issue pardons, call for
referendums, and the power "to comply with and secure
20011
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW
compliance with this Constitution and the law."'" All of these
powers are executive in nature and are exercised, in one form or
another, by most of the chief executives in other democracies.
Where Venezuela's enumerated presidential powers do not reflect
a typically executive authority is in clause 8 of Article 236, which
allows the President "to issue, with prior authorization by an
enabling law, decrees with the force of law."92 While an "enabling
law" provision did exist under the Constitution of 1961, the
delegation of authority under that Constitution was restricted to
economic and financial matters and was always made with a
fairly well-defined scope. Considering the overall executive
nature of the President's powers, the limited scope of previous
"enabling laws" and Venezuela's recent history of striving to
prevent a return to its authoritarian past, one could reasonably
infer that the Venezuelan people did not intend to confer
complete lawmaking powers on the President when they ratified
this Constitution.
While the Venezuelan people have demonstrated disgust
with the traditional political parties and a desire for dramatic
change, nothing has indicated that they want to abandon the
separation of powers or the system of checks and balances.
Despite a severe economic downturn and military activism,
Venezuelans have remained remarkably committed to the three-
branch form of government. Throughout all the sessions of the
Constitutional Assembly no other structural model was even
entertained.9 " The sort of dramatic change that Venezuelans
presumably desire can still be realized without empowering the
President with nearly complete lawmaking powers. After all, the
Chavistas did win a majority in the National Assembly.' As long
as President Chavez can maintain party discipline, he should be
able to adopt through the legislative process the very same
reforms which he now wants to issue by decree." The amount of
time Chavez might save by issuing decrees instead of going
through the National Assembly is probably outweighed by the
91. CONST. OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA (1999), 5:2 art.
236.
92. CONST. OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA (1999), 5:2 art.
236(8).
93. Ellner, supra note 53.
94. Assembly likely to back Chavez (August 14, 2000), FINANCIAL TIMES,
available at http://www.Fr.com/.
95. Cordoba, supra note 1.
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quality of legislation which can be produced by a deliberative
body and the damage being perpetrated on the institutional
integrity of the National Assembly.96
In his work concerning presidential authority in Venezuela,
Brian Crisp cited five factors which indicated that the "enabling
law" provision of the 1961 Constitution did not undermine the
separation of powers or the system of checks and balances in
Venezuela. These five factors are as follows:
1. [T]he Constitution restricts delegated decree
authority to economic and financial matters;
2. the authority has been delegated only five
times;
3. the time for which such authority is granted is
limited (increasingly so as of late);
4. the instructions provided to the president by
Congress can be quite detailed; and
5. the provisions for oversight can be fairly
rigorous.9"
It is important to note that the "enabling law" provision of the
1999 Constitution and the November, 2000, "enabling law" do not
meet any of Crisp's five criteria. The 1999 Constitution, unlike
the 1961 Constitution, does not limit the subject area for
delegated decree authority. President Chavez has been granted
decree authority pursuant to an "enabling law" twice in two
years. Bucking the recent trend, the grant of decree authority
under the November, 2000, "enabling law" lasts for a year and
granted authority in very broad and poorly defined policy areas.
Lastly, there are no provisions for oversight under either the
1999 Constitution or the November, 2000, "enabling law."
The 1999 Constitution does provide a process by which
unconstitutional usurpations of power, such as the November,
2000, "enabling law," can be corrected. Article 335 declares the
following:
[TIhe Supreme Tribunal of Justice will guarantee
the supremacy and effectiveness of the
constitutional norms and principles; it will be the
96. Id.
97. Crisp, supra note 59.
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maximum and final interpreter of the Constitution
and will see to its uniform interpretation and
application."
Article 336 goes on to grant the Supreme Tribunal the power to
"declare the total or partial nullity of the national laws and other
acts with rank of law from the national legislative bodies that
conflict with this Constitution" and "to declare the total or partial
nullity of the acts with rank of law dictated by the National
Executive that conflict with this Constitution."99 Consequently,
the Supreme Tribunal has the power to overturn both the
November, 2000, "enabling law" and any Presidential decrees
issued pursuant to it. Following the earlier conclusion that the
November, 2000, "enabling law" is inconsistent with the doctrine
of separation of powers embodied in the Constitution, there are
grounds to, entertain, at the very least, a challenge to this law.
However, any challenge to the November, 2000, "enabling
law" faces two obstacles, a Supreme Tribunal sympathetic to
President Chavez and the adoption of previous enabling laws.
The Supreme Tribunal could distinguish the November, 2000,
"enabling law" from previous "enabling laws" on the basis of its
poorly defined scope. However, the fact that an "enabling law"
was utilized under the previous Constitutional framework can
also be used to argue that "enabling laws" are an acceptable
exercise of the legislative function. The second obstacle is the
composition of the high court whose justices where elected to
twelve year terms during Chavez's landslide re-election in July of
2000. While the justices' judicial philosophies are not well
known, they have been reluctant to confront President Chavez's
expansion of presidential powers, as will be evidenced infra in
the summary of President Chavez's relations with the national
labor unions. It seems unlikely that the Justices of the Supreme
Tribunal will antagonize a President who helped get them
elected and who already demonstrated a willingness to ignore the
unfavorable rulings of the previous Supreme Court. The chances
that the Supreme Tribunal will exercise its power of judicial
review to overturn the November, 2000, "enabling law" are very
slim. President Chavez's usurpation of legislative powers will
98. CONST. OF THE BOLVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA (1999), 8:1 art.
335.





In brief, the November, 2000, "enabling law" violates the
1999 Constitution because it is inconsistent with the doctrine of
separation of powers embodied in that document. The National
Assembly is obligated by the Constitution to act as the nation's
legislature, and any ceding of its legislative powers, via the
adoption of an enabling law, must be limited in substance and
time. The Supreme Tribunal's potential reluctance to overrule
the November, 2000, "enabling law" is more likely a product of
political circumstances than a demonstration of sound judicial
review, but the possibility still exists that the high court will
correct the present Constitutional imbalance. The entire text of
the 1999 Constitution, along with recent Venezuelan history, and
the will of the Venezuelan people as expressed in recent
elections, indicate that a President empowered to decree laws
over a wide range of issues is not consistent with the letter and
spirit of the Constitution.
V. THE ENABLING LAW'S EFFECT ON THE VENEZUELAN
POLITICAL SYSTEM
The November, 2000, "enabling law" weakens President
Chavez's political opposition in two ways. In an immediate and
direct manner, the "enabling law" effectively silences the elected
opposition in the National Assembly. In an indirect yet more far
reaching way, the "enabling law" threatens to deprive the
Venezuelan upper classes of their vested interests in the present
economic system. At a time when an effective opposition should
be forming to serve as a democratic check on Chavez's power, the
"enabling law" has essentially silenced the opposition legislators
who could possibly serve that role. More ominous still is the
possibility that a democratic opposition will never form if
President Chavez follows through on his promises of economic
reform and the social pledges made in the 1999 Constitution. By
increasing state intervention in the economy, the Venezuelan
business class could be forced out of politics either by
impoverishing or exiling them. One of the centerpieces of
Venezuelan democracy between 1958 and 1998, was the presence
of a strong opposition party."°' As President Chavez continues to
100. John D. Martz, Political Parties and the Democratic Crisis, supra note 3, at 32-
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turn over all the traditional, political institutions, consolidates
more powers to himself, and threatens to redistribute the
nation's wealth, the tradition of a competitive political system
may be at an end.
During the July, 2000, elections for the National Assembly,
President Chavez's party, the Movement for the Fifth Republic
[hereinafter, "MVR"], and its political partner the Movement to
Socialism [hereinafter, "MAS"] fell ten seats short of a two thirds
majority."'O AD along with COPEI and a few smaller parties won
sixty-five of the 165 seats in the National Assembly.' ° This could
have potentially proved to be a complicating factor for Mr.
Chavez because the 1999 Constitution required a two thirds vote
of the National Assembly for the adoption of "organic laws,"
defined by the Venezuelan Constitution as laws "dictated to
organize the public powers or to develop constitutional rights and
those that serve as the normative framework for other laws.""0 3
The opposition in the National Assembly was in a position to
block or obtain concessions from Chavez's major reform efforts.
However, President Chavez was able to circumvent this obstacle
just as deftly as he had done with the previous AD and COPEI
dominated legislature. While passage of an "organic law"
required 110 votes, adoption of an "enabling law" only required a
three fifths vote or ninety-nine votes, and Chavez had one more
vote than was necessary. The Venezuelan Congress of 1998 to
1999 was rendered impotent through the election of a
Constitutional Assembly and the use of force. In 2000, Chavez
dispatched a potentially troublesome legislative opposition by
loosely interpreting his 1999 Constitution and obtaining passage
of an "enabling law," which gave him almost limitless power to
decree laws.
The debilitating effects of this move on the opposition are
obvious. Individuals who should be serving in a capacity as
lawmakers and enacting laws that are a product of executive and
legislative compromise are now forced to accept legislation
decreed by President Chavez. The powerlessness of the
opposition may have a cumulative effect as others opposed to
Chavez give up their efforts because of the futility of
101. Bloomberg Latin America, Venezuelan National Assembly Leaders Set Ambitious
Agenda (Aug. 15, 2000), available at http:lquote.bloomberg.com/news2.
102. Id.
103. CONST. OF THE BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA (1999), art. 203.
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participating in the political system. Worse yet is the possibility
that Chavez continues to enact "enabling laws" at one-year
intervals and thereby extinguishes the chance of there ever being
an effective elected opposition.
Chavez, however, may not have to rely on more "enabling
laws" to silence the opposition if he is able to deliver on his
promises of social and economic reform. A great part of Chavez's
opposition comes from the business sector and other wealthy
groups in Venezuelan society.' The political strength of this
group is not its small size but its superior resources. If Chavez
were to redistribute the nation's wealth, this group's political
strength would be greatly diminished, and many of its members
may even be forced into exile. The immigration of middle and
upper class Venezuelans to the United States has already greatly
increased in recent years.
Every indication thus far has been that Chavez will pursue a
course of redistributing the nation's wealth. At a celebration of
Simon Bolivar's birthday, Chavez "unsheathed the Liberator's
sword outside his birthplace in the old colonial center of Caracas
and declared: 'We won't rest until we have wiped out the last
vestiges of the oligarchy."" 6 When discussing his plan for land
reform the President declared, "Big landowners, your time has
come."' 7 If Chavez's rhetoric and the commitments made by the
1999 Constitution are taken seriously, there is ample reason to
believe that the "enabling law" figuratively places the head of the
Venezuelan political opposition on the executioner's block as it
awaits the "guillotine blade" of Chavez's economic and social
reforms.
Concerns for the future of Venezuelan democracy are, of
course, to a great extent premised upon the notion that President
Chavez, despite pronouncements otherwise, desires dictatorial
powers. It is impossible to conclusively prove what Chavez's
motives are but, aside from the previously mentioned indications
of authoritarian tendencies, a good idea of how he wants to
104. Juan 0. Tamayo, Tension between Chavez, army spur talk of coup, THE MIAMI
HERALD, Feb. 21, 2001, at 5A.
105. Exodus from South America Biggest Since 1980's, THE MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 5,
2000, at All.
106. After two years Chavez remains an enigma (Jul. 29, 2000, FINANCIAL TIMES,
available at http://www.FT.com.
107. Reuters, supra note 73.
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govern is provided by how he has confronted, not the wealthy,
but Venezuela's organized labor unions.
The Confederation of Venezuelan Workers [hereinafter,
"CTV"] and its 900 constituent member unions were one of the
last remaining bastions of AD/COPEI power.' In the latter part
of 2000, Chavez moved to eliminate this source of opposition
also.9  In September of 2000, Chavez organized a rival
confederation, the Bolivarian Workers Force [hereinafter, "FTB"]
and declared at its first meeting: "Gentlemen of the CTV, the
Bolivarian Workers Force is going to crush you and toss you
away.''. Chavez proceeded to call a national referendum in
which all voters were to decide whether the union members
should hold elections for new leaders."' Despite protests from
international labor organizations that this was a violation of
union autonomy and challenges filed but later rejected by the
Supreme Tribunal of Justice, the referendum took place and the
Chavez supported 'Yes" option carried sixty-five percent of the
vote.
11'
In what seems to have become a sort of Chavez formula for
governing, any opposition that the President encounters within
the system is overcome by resorting either to legislative
maneuvers to grant him increased powers or the calling of a
referendum in which Chavez utilizes his personal popularity to
do away with the opposition. If President Chavez continues on
this course, the inevitable outcome will be the elimination of the
political opposition and a complete consolidation of political
power under his authority. Contrary to Chavez's claims of
preserving democracy in Venezuela, he may very well be
engaging in its dismantling.
Chavez's style of governing has had much in common with
that of former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori. Both men
108. Chavez turns on union leaders (Nov. 22, 2000), FINANCIAL TIMES, available at
http:/Jwww.FT.com.
109. Id.
110. Bloomberg Latin America, Venezuela's Chavez Seeks to Create Single National
Labor Union (Sept. 4, 2000), available at
http'//quote.bloomberg.com/news2.cgi?T=sa-politics.ht&s=AObPCYhZtVmVuZXp.. ./Ea.
111. Chavez turns on union leaders, supra note 108.
112. Voters shun Chavez's unions drive (Dec. 4, 2000), FINANCIAL TIMES, available
at http://www.FT.com. In an indication of how apathetic the Venezuelan electorate had
become to Chavez called elections, abstention in the labor union referendum was
somewhere between eighty-five percent and ninety percent.
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were elected as populist outsiders pledging to end the rule of the
old political order and usher in dramatic reforms. When
encountered with entrenched opposition in the other branches of
government, both Fujimori and Chavez found ways to circumvent
these obstacles. Fujimori engaged in an "auto coup" in which he
summarily dissolved Congress and the Judiciary and then called
for the election of a new Constitutional Assembly.' Chavez,
perhaps learning from the international condemnation which
greeted Fujimori's actions, reversed the Peruvian's tactics and
called for the election of a new Constitutional Assembly before
paralyzing the other branches of government thereby lending his
actions a more democratic veneer. Where the two strong
presidents differ is in their economic and social views. In
contrast to Fujimori's embrace of free market reforms and pro-
business policies, Chavez has called for increased state
intervention in the economy and a redistribution of the nation's
wealth. President Chavez's statist and leftist economic policy
views and his ability to enact them via the "enabling law" will
not only effect the domestic political and economic scene but the
interests of foreign capital as well.
VI. THE ENABLING LAW'S EFFECT ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT
IN VENEZUELA
As opposed to the domestic political sphere, the concept of
the "enabling law," on its own, has no effect on foreign
investment. What will effect foreign investment is how and to
what ends President Chavez utilizes the "enabling law." While
Chavez has not directly threatened foreign investments, his use
of the enabling law to redistribute wealth within Venezuela and
to meet the social goals of the 1999 Constitution will most likely
have a "chilling effect" on foreign investment. It is highly
unlikely that foreign interests will want to invest in a nation
whose government is not friendly to or respective of the rights of
local capital and whose priority appears to be the creation of a
social welfare state and not economic growth.
Not much information is available concerning the details of
the economic reforms Mr. Chavez wants to enact under the
auspices of the "enabling law" but, thus far, all indications are
113. John M. Carey and Matthew Soberg Shugart, Calling Out the Tanks or Filling
Out the Forms, in EXECUTIVE DECREE AUTHORITY, supra 59, at 15.
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that foreign investments, unlike domestic capital, will not be a
target of the intended reforms. While the 1999 Constitution
prohibits the privatization of PDVSA, the state oil company,
Chavez has announced that the possibility of joint ventures
between foreign companies and PDVSA in related fields, such as
the manufacture of petrochemicals, will be possible."4  While
Chavez has been bombastic in his criticism of domestic capital
interests, he has refrained from calling for the nationalization of
any economic sectors highly penetrated by foreign investment
and from espousing any return to high tariff import substitution
policies.
At present, there appears to be no direct threat to foreign
investment such as expropriation or nationalization. What
should be, and most likely is, causing concern in international
business circles is the increased business costs arising from
President Chavez's domestic reforms along with the uncertainty
as to how the President will fund his ambitious social programs.
Chavez's newly proposed hydrocarbon law raises the amount of
royalties charged to foreign contractors doing business with
PDVSA."' His new job creation program, described as similar to
that of Sandinista Nicaragua, along with an expected dramatic
increase in the minimum wage will make Venezuelan labor
considerably more costly."' President Chavez has admitted that
the government cannot presently afford to fund the social
commitments made by the 1999 Constitution. Foreign
investors may then suspect that Chavez will not hesitate to erect
tariffs and increase taxation on foreign interests in order to fulfill
his guarantees of universal education, health care, employment,
and social security.
If history is a reliable indicator, foreign economic interests
have reason to worry about President Chavez. Juan Domingo
Peron, the president of Argentina from 1946 to 1955, was, like
Chavez, a former military officer who was elected president as a
result of the lower classes frustration with the traditional
political order. Peron also espoused his own political ideology,
justicialism, which, like Bolivarism, evoked fierce nationalism
114. Hoag, supra note 65.
115. Cordoba, supra note 1.
116. Chavez details economic vision, FINANCIAL TIMES, (Aug. 2, 2000), available at
http'J/www.FT.com.
117. Hoag, supra note 65.
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and called for greater state intervention in the economy to
improve the living standards of the lower classes."' Unlike
Chavez, Peron pursued the nationalization of foreign-owned
industries. However, he also pursued certain domestic economic
reforms which led to significant reductions in foreign
investments."9  Peron's indexing of the minimum wage to
inflation, his price controls on industrial goods, his constant
favoring of organized labor over management (by 1951, it was
estimated that the ordinary Argentine worker took a day off for
every two spent on the job) had devastating effects on foreign
investment. Between 1945 and 1949, foreign investment in
Argentina declined (in constant 1950 dollars) from $4.26 billion
to $41.74 million."0 To the extent that Peron and Chavez's
economic beliefs coincide, Peronist economics demonstrate that
Chavez's government centered economic policies and foreign
capital cannot peacefully co-exist.
Chavez's domestic economic reforms combined with the
prospect that he may turn to foreign investment as a funding
source for the creation of his egalitarian Bolivarian society may
have the disastrous effect of decreasing foreign investment in
Venezuela. As Venezuela faces an unemployment rate of
fourteen percent, an inflation rate of fifteen percent, a poverty
rate of eighty percent, and a constantly fluctuating price of oil, it
seems that the "enabling law," should be utilized not for the goals
of Chavez's economic and social revolution but for the luring of
much needed foreign investment.
VII. CONCLUSION
At a public address in April of 2000, John Maisto, the United
States Ambassador to Venezuela, stated that "[d]emocracy in
Venezuela is alive and well.""' While Ambassador Maisto may
have desired to reflect favorably upon the plethora of elections
and referenda which have recently taken place in Venezuela, it is
difficult to support his statement when one looks at the tendency
of President Chavez to consolidate an increasing amount of
118. Paul H. Lewis, THE CRISIS OF ARGENTINE CAPITALISM 162 (1992).
119. Id. at 181-182.
120. Id. at 205.
121. Ambassador John F. Maisto, Address to the World Affairs Council of Pittsburgh
(Apr. 10, 2000), available at http://www.worldaffairspittsburgh.org/Maisto.html.
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power under his authority. A democratic system of government
involves more than the holding of periodic elections, but also
encompasses some sort of structural limitations preventing the
concentration of political power in one individual. It is not a
democracy if the people elect a dictator every four or five years.
Venezuela's 1999 Constitution attempts to provide such
limitations but the November, 2000, "enabling law" disregards
them by granting President Chavez nearly limitless legislative
powers. This Constitutional violation also has the further
detrimental consequences of weakening Chavez's political
opposition and discouraging much needed foreign investment.
Every democratic "presidential" system of government in the
world is characterized by a separation of powers among different
branches of government. 12 Venezuela's 1999 Constitution follows
the traditional separation of powers among executive, legislative,
and judicial branches of government. Even in systems
characterized by very strong presidents, such as Fujimori's Peru,
the legislature exercises effective checking powers as has
recently been demonstrated by the Peruvian Congress' removal
of President Fujimori. 23 What the November, 2000, "enabling
law" threatens to accomplish is the ceding of legislative authority
to the executive and the consequent diminishing of the National
Assembly's checking power. This transfer of authority is not
tolerated by the 1999 Constitution, which clearly empowers the
National Assembly with legislative functions and mandates that
neither branch usurp the powers of another. Nor is the
November, 2000, "enabling law" consistent with previously
adopted "enabling laws." In order for democratic government to
continue in Venezuela, this imbalance in the separation of
powers must be corrected either by fiat of the Supreme Court or
by remedial measures taken by the National Assembly or the
President.
The political effects of the "enabling law," however, are not
only limited to the doctrine of separation of powers. The
"enabling law" by depriving opposition legislators of their role in
enacting legislation further weakens the forces aligned against
President Chavez and the institutional integrity of the branches
122. Mainwaring and Shugart, supra note 75, at 14-16.
123. Fujimori Found Unfit to be President, THE MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 22, 2000, at
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which are supposed to balance the executive's power. For over
forty years, Venezuelan politics was characterized by intense
competition between political parties. At present, due to a
combination of Chavez's political machinations and the
opposition's ineptness, President Chavez has not faced any
effective opposition and the National Assembly appears to be
serving a greatly reduced legislative function. If this course of
events continues, complete consolidation of power seems
inevitable.
Expanded powers for President Chavez also means that he
will more easily be able to enact his economic and social reforms.
The fact that these reforms will increase the cost of doing
business in Venezuela along with the uncertainty as to how
Chavez will fund his ambitious social programs will most likely
create a "chilling effect" on foreign investment prospects. At a
time when developing nations need to adhere to free market
orthodoxy in order receive the help of international financial
organizations and foreign investors, rhetoric about revolutionary
change is counter productive. The "enabling law" hinders
Venezuela's ability to attract the foreign capital it will need if oil
prices remain within the range of the last twenty years. This
perhaps will lead to one of the great ironies of Venezuelan
history: the nation's most powerful president of the last forty
years, a president who has written a new Constitution and been
granted the power to decree laws will be unable to relieve the
suffering of the impoverished masses which elected him to do just
that. With these considerations in mind, to say that
"[d]emocracy in Venezuela is alive and well," is premature.124 A
more accurate assessment would be that democracy is "alive" in
Venezuela, but its future health depends on a new respect for
Constitutional limitations on presidential power.
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